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Abstract 
In June 2013, Mexico reformed its Constitution to promote competition, diminish 
entry barriers, and strengthen its telecommunications sector. The Economic Competition 
Federal Law marked Mexico’s most radical move yet to revamp its telecommunications 
institutional framework, fight vested interests, and change the competitive landscape in 
hopes to boost investment and improve services. This report evaluates the Federal 
Telecommunications Institute (IFT) policy decisions and looks at market indicators in the 
fixed and mobile markets to assess change.  
The IFT has had important institutional wins effectively implementing most 
asymmetric regulations. The courts have upheld its decisions, and –amid some 
controversy– selected a winner for the 700MHz band PPP contract. While three years is 
hardly enough time for structural change to take effect, evidence shows overall sector 
growth but little or no change in the competitive landscape trend. Market concentration 
remains high, broadband coverage and internet access remain at lower income country 
levels, and while mobile telephony prices have decreased, broadband prices have not. 
Furthermore, total investment and investment per revenue increased in the fixed market, 
although not in the mobile market. Finally, eliminating foreign investment caps has already 
benefited consumers with AT&T entering the mobile market and its subsequent removal 
of national and international roaming fees.  
This report concludes that, despite their shortfalls, the 2013 Constitutional Reform 
and Telecommunications Law have contributed to overall institutional stability and sector 
growth.
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Constitutional Reform   
Mexico’s highly concentrated and largely unregulated telecommunications sector 
limited its ability to encourage competition throughout the end of the twentieth century. 
While privatization brought improvements, a weak institutional framework made 
regulation ineffective. Liberalization failed to encourage market entry, stimulate 
investment, and promote competition.  
In June 2013, Mexico reformed its Constitution to strengthen its ‘dysfunctional’ 
telecommunications sector, which, through its inefficiency reduced total welfare by USD 
129.2 billion per year.1 The Economic Competition Federal Law marked Mexico’s most 
radical move yet to revamp its telecommunications institutional framework, fight vested 
interests and change the competitive landscape in hopes to boost investment and improve 
services. The 2013 Reform was an attempt to correct the institutional weakness and limited 
competition that resulted from the 1996 liberalization.  
The liberalization reform privatized state-owned Telmex, (now a subsidiary of 
América Móvil) and guaranteed it a six-year national monopoly with little oversight. The 
now extinct regulatory agency, Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones (COFETEL), 
started operating six years after the privatization, was subject to short term political 
pressures and did not have an independent budget.2 Privatization was ineffective due to the 
lack of openness, transparency and exclusion of relevant parties in the process. The market 
remained highly concentrated with limited geographic coverage, high prices, poor quality 
services and low investment.  
                                                
1 OECD, Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Mexico, (2012). 
2 Scott Wallsten, A New Dawn for Telecommunications in Mexico?, Technology Policy Institute, (2014). 
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The 2013 Constitutional Reform3 seemed different from the onset. One of its 
biggest components was the creation of the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT, for 
its acronym in Spanish) to replace COFETEL and granting it with greater enforcement 
capabilities. Since the Reform, important developments followed. The Federal 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law4 was signed in July 2014 missing the 
constitutionally-mandated December 2013 deadline.5 In 2015, AT&T entered the mobile 
market by purchasing Iusacell and Nextel –the third and fourth largest operators 
respectively by market share. Also, the IFT auctioned new spectrum in the AWS and 
800Mhz bands, increasing commercially available spectrum by 40 percent, and published 
bidding requirements to operate a wholesale-only network in the 700MHz band, as 
mandated by the Constitutional Reform.  
IFT has also had important wins. The government has supported IFT rulings –
opposed to COFETEL’s prior experience– and the courts have upheld its decisions, the 
most important being the declaration of América Móvil and its subsidiaries including 
Telmex and Telcel6 as “preponderant” in March 2014.7 Under the new law, any firm with 
more than 50 percent of subscribers is assumed to have market dominance and thus subject 
to specific rules and regulatory oversight. 
                                                
3 Will refer to as ‘Reform’ from here on.  
4 Secondary Law is that which hierarchically follows Constitutional Law and modifies federal, state and 
local laws with detailed regulation.   
5 The Executive presented a bill until March 2014. 
6 Telmex (includes Telnor) and Telcel (Radiomóvil Dipsa) are America Móvil subsidiaries in the fixed and 
mobile markets respectively. This report will use the name América Móvil when refering to both. 
7 Mexico uses the term “preponderant” as an equivalent for market dominance. “Dominant” will be used 
here on as synonym for preponderance.  
IFT, “Resolution by which the Board of the Federal Telecommunications Institute determines the economic 
group conformed by América Móvil, Teléfonos de México (TELMEX) and its subsidiaries as preponderant 
operator in the telecommunications sector,” March 6, 2014.  
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By the end of 2015, América Móvil controlled 66.7 percent of the fixed market and 
66.5 percent of the mobile market, down from 72 and 70 percent respectively at the time 
of the Reform. IFT concludes in its own three-year review that the Reform produced 
significant results including greater competition, lower prices, broader service offerings, 
quality improvements, more infrastructure, and higher foreign direct investment.8 
However, IFT analysis highlights short-term achievements and fails to provide an overall 
picture of the competitive landscape.  
It is important to highlight the difference between IFT’s objectives and policy 
success. For IFT, success lies in its ability to implement the law –which this report finds it 
has– while regulatory results are more nuanced. This report does not attempt to attribute 
change –or lack thereof– to specific regulations but rather looks at a longer time frame to 
answer whether the 2013 Reform has had positive institutional and regulatory outcomes. 
While three years is hardly enough time for structural change to take effect, 
evidence shows overall sector growth but little or no change in the competitive landscape 
trend. Perhaps the most relevant result is the increase of investment as a share of revenue 
from 11 to 15 percent as displayed in figure 1.  
                                                
8 IFT, Telecommunications in Mexico. Three Years After the Constitutional Reform, (2016). 
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Figure 1: Total Investment as a Share of Revenue 
 
Note: IFT 2015 figures are not always consistent with operators’ financial statements, if different 
the number reported by operator is used. 
Source: IFT 4Q2015 and 4Q2014 Statistics Reports, América Móvil 4Q2014 and 4Q2015 Financial 
Reports, Megacable 4Q2015 Financial Report, Axtel 4Q 2015 Financial Results Press Release.  
América Móvil reported 80 percent higher investment in the fixed market for 2015, 
accounting for 52.9 percent of total investment. Total investment growth from MXN 27.3 
billion in 2013 to MXN 47.6 billion in 2015 and Telmex-Telnor doubling its investment 
percentage to 25 percent indicates that America Móvil was not only able to overcome the 
burden of regulation but could further invest in the fixed sector to maintain its market 
power. The increase can be attributed to América Móvil previously underinvesting and 
now having stronger incentives to invest due to competitive pressure. While this single 
change portrays an optimistic story, a deeper analysis of market share, coverage and price 
changes in the fixed and mobile markets reveals mixed results.  
In the fixed market, Telmex already faced a steadily declining market share since 
2013, with no apparent change after the Reform. Furthermore, Telmex’s broadband prices 
increased and its speed performance is worse than its competitors at 5.2Mbps. In the mobile 
market, Telcel’s market share had been slowly decreasing since 2006 and experienced its 













contribute to this trend. By Q2 2016, AT&T controlled 9.2 percent of total subscriptions, 
less than the combined market share of purchased providers –Iusacell and Nextel– at the 
time of the reform. This said, the market grew substantially since the Reform with mobile 
broadband connections doubling from 24.4 to 50.1 connections per 100 people and mobile 
internet unique subscribers growing by 16.2 to 44.7 per 100 people by Q2 2016.9  
In terms of prices, mobile telephony prices dropped 28.9 percent from 2013 to 2015 
but the declining trend precedes reform and overall internet service prices did not change 
within the same period. Despite decreasing market participation, Telcel’s revenue 
remained stable in the last three years once again signaling that it has managed to overcome 
the impact of asymmetric regulation and increase its investment as a share of revenue by 
1.4 percent. However, the mobile market’s total investment went down as a share revenue 
in contrast to the fixed market as AT&T’s investment in 2015 was lower than the combined 
investment of Iusacell and Nextel in 2013. This drop may be a result of AT&T merging 
two providers which takes time and can benefit from a more efficient allocation of 
investments.  
 
COMPONENTS OF THE NEW LAW  
The new law aimed to strengthen regulatory enforcement by granting the IFT 
constitutional autonomy and an independent budget –approved by its board and included 
in the annual Federal Budget presented to Congress. The board was increased from five to 
seven commissioners and candidates are now subject to committee evaluation prior to 
Executive approval and Senate ratification to limit political partisanship and prevent 
regulatory capture. 
                                                
9 ITU, GSMA Intelligence. 
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The law also defines as dominant any telecommunications firm with more than 50 
percent of users, subscribers or network traffic by relevant market and thus subject to 
asymmetric regulation.10 Regulations include on-net/off-net nondiscrimination, removal of 
national roaming charges, infrastructure sharing, unbundled access to the dominant 
associated network and zero-price interconnection. Table 1 describes each measure and its 
policy objective.  
Table 1: Asymmetric Regulation Measures Descriptions and Objectives 
MEASURE DESCRIPTION OBJECTIVE  
On-net/off-net non-
discrimination 
Tariff removal for calls 
within (on-net) and outside 
(off-net) the dominant 
firm’s network.  
Eliminate consumer 
preference to remain on the 
network with most users. 
Removal of national 
roaming charges  
No additional costs for 
final users initiating or 
receiving out of state calls.   
Lower prices for consumers. 
Sharing infrastructure 
Access to dominant firm’s 
infrastructure by 
competitors.  
Reduce entry costs and give 
incentive to service providers 
to enter the market. 
Network unbundling Access to last mile local public network.11 Increase retail competition. 
Zero-price 
interconnection 
Competitors interconnect to 
the dominant firm’s 
network at a price of zero. 
Prevent unjustified rent 
extraction by incumbent. 
Allow small competitors to 
widen coverage and increase 
market share. 
Source: Derived from Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusion (LFTR) and Wallsten 
(2014).  
                                                
10 Article 131, Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión, July 2014. 
11 Under the law a local public network is defined as a “telecommunications network through which 
telecommunications services are commercially exploited” and does not define specific markets.  
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The law also allows firms to buy and sell spectrum licenses on a secondary market 
and establishes a wholesale-only wireless network in the 700 MHz band where the state 
retains control of the spectrum but builds and operates to provide wholesale services 
through a public-private partnership. The 700 MHz band will be part of the project Red 
Compartida which seeks to provide telecommunications coverage to at least 85 percent of 
the population by 2022.12 
From design, initial sources for concern about the law’s effectiveness include the 
arbitrary one-size-fits-all preponderance definition by market –not service–, the set zero-
price interconnection, network unbundling and its potential to diminish incentives to invest, 
and the decision to keep 90 MHz of the 700 MHz band.13 Some of these decisions stemmed 
from a history of weak regulatory enforcement. This Reform simply established set 
definitions for market dominance and zero-price interconnection to overcome failed 
attempts to declare América Móvil (particularly Telmex) with ‘substantial market power’ 
in 1997 and 2007 that only led to legal injunctions and decision overturns.14  
 
  
                                                
12 Five years after PPP contract is signed, approximate date changed after RFP was published to first half 
of 2017. 
13 Although controversial, other countries with a single telephone network have also opted for unbundling. 
Scott Wallsten (2014) op. cit. 
14 CFC, Declaratoria a Telmex Como Agente Con Poder Sustancial En Cinco Mercados Relevantes, 
(2009).  
Diario Oficial de la Federación, “Resolución Sobre Poder Sustancial de Teléfonos de México,” May 2007. 
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What has Changed?  
LONG AWAITED DIVESTITURE  
América Móvil was declared dominant in the telecommunications sector under the 
law’s definition measured by its share of users in both fixed and mobile markets. In 
response, América Móvil, after filing unsuccessful legal injunctions, announced intentions 
to sell assets to fall below the 50 percent threshold and avoid asymmetric regulation. The 
announcement suggested that the law had achieved a first success by reducing market 
concentration without costly regulation or regulatory battles. However, no transaction has 
taken place.15 América Móvil stated it postponed its divestiture plans due to the entrance 
of AT&T into the Mexican market and requested that regulations should be diminished and 
its dominant position in both markets revised.16 Most recent data from The CIU and GSMA 
Intelligence for fixed and mobile markets respectively suggests that, aside from 
asymmetric regulation not being fully implemented, Telmex and Telcel’s market 
participation by subscribers is still above the mandated 50 percent threshold. Additionally, 
the sale of assets on itself would not automatically remove América Móvil’s preponderance 
status. Under the law, IFT would have to evaluate its effect in terms of subscriptions –the 
same metric that declared it dominant– for each market. 
Despite avoiding divestiture, América Móvil has undergone some restructuring. In 
September 2015, it created Telesites to construct, install, maintain and operate its passive 
infrastructure17 –approximately 10,800 mobile towers– through its subsidiary Opsimex. 
Telesites is now the second largest tower operator in Latin America with 12,874 towers 
                                                
15 Telmex, Report on America Móvil to the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV), (Mexico City, 2014). 
16 “Reconsiderar Condición de Preponderante, Pide América Móvil,” El Financiero, July 16, 2015, 
accessed July 25, 2016. 
17 Non-electronic assets such as towers, antennas and other physical infrastructure. 
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and 54 percent market share in Mexico for 2015.18 Because this move represents only an 
administrative separation, the IFT declared that Telesites is still subject to asymmetric 
regulation.  
 
IFT AUTHORITY  
The IFT has had important wins and setbacks. IFT began operations without a 
regulatory framework. Due to delays from the Executive branch, the secondary law was 
enacted seven months after scheduled, was controversial, and was thought to constrain the 
IFT by being too specific –limiting its capacity to regulate dynamic markets.19 Interest 
groups and experts recommended that IFT file an appeal to the Supreme Court; however, 
the motion for the revision of 52 articles led by two IFT commissioners was voted down 
by the remaining board members.20 IFT’s faculties were later tested in December 2014 
when the Senate issued its own appeal claiming the IFT had superseded its authority, 
invading that of Congress over number portability regulation. The Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously in favor of IFT.  
The IFT has imposed fines amounting to MXN 657.6 million (USD 36.5 million) 
by Q2 2016 in both the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors (see appendix).21 Of 
relevance was IFT’s sanction to América Móvil in January 2015 for not seeking IFT 
                                                
18 TowerXChange. http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/empresas/telesites-telxius-y-american-tower-pelearan-
por-liderar-el-negocio-de-torres.html 
19 Judith Mariscal, “Los Retos Que Enfrenta la Reforma de Telecomunicaciones,” in Reforma de 
Telecomunicaciones y Competencia Económica - México más productivo y más competitivo (MAPorrúa, 
2014). 
20 “Entrevista con Carmen Aristegui Sobre Propuesta de Controversia Constitucional Contra LFTR,” 
February 5, 2015. 
21 Estimated by author based on IFT’s website. 
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approval for a 51 percent share purchase of broadcasting operator Dish México.22  While 
other reasons might have played into the decision, América Móvil ultimately renounced its 
purchase rights. IFT has used its new legal attributions to sanction service providers for 
anticompetitive practices and its authority could be undermined if sanctions are dismissed 
by legal injunctions, a common result under COFETEL’s mandate. Generally, firms file 
legal injunctions and the treasury cannot charge fines until all judicial proceedings are 
resolved. 
On the competition and consumer welfare front, the picture is not so 
straightforward. IFT has adopted new regulations that could hamper competition in the 
long-term. These regulations:  
• reduced the interconnection price that the dominant firm pays to competitors by 
38.7% to MXN 0.19 per minute in the last two years which lowers prices but 
decreases competitors’ revenue;  
• leased additional spectrum in the Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) 1.7 MHz 
and 2.1 MHz bands through a Combinatorial Clock Auction securing América 
Móvil 40MHz –who now holds 41 percent of all leased spectrum up from 30 
percent– and AT&T, the only other participant, 20MHz;23 
• gradually reduced Calling Party Pays tariff which lowers prices for consumers 
on the dominant network but reduces switching incentives.24 
                                                
22 IFT, “El Pleno del IFT Resuelve que las Relaciones Contractuales entre Telmex y Dish México 
Constituyen Una Concentración Que Debió Ser Notificada Antes de Su Realización (Comunicado 
2/2015),” January 13, 2015. 
23 The CIU, “Sector Convergente: Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión en México,” March 11, 2016. 
24 Ernesto Piedras, “Contrarreforma del Regulador,” The CIU, July 14, 2016. 
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ASYMMETRIC REGULATION  
As part of a biennial impact evaluation, on April 2016 the IFT issued a public 
consultation on the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation applicable to dominant firms. 
The consultation concluded that three of the asymmetric regulations have been enforced 
and two delayed. 
Fully enforced regulations include on-net/off-net nondiscrimination, elimination of 
national roaming charges and zero-price interconnection from competitors to dominant 
firm. Infrastructure sharing and network unbundling –perhaps the most crucial to obtain 
service-based competition despite its limitations mentioned above– were not implemented 
until January 2016. America Móvil (Telmex, Telnor and Telcel) submitted its infrastructure 
sharing reference offer in June 2015 and was approved in November 2015.25 Telmex and 
Telnor submitted its local loop unbundling reference in November and was approved in 
December 2015, more than a year and a half after America Móvil was declared dominant.26  
 
SECONDARY SPECTRUM MARKET 
In March 2016, IFT issued guidelines that enabled the secondary spectrum market 
for commercial and private use.27 This measure allows market access to radio spectrum 
already available without additional government involvement and helps ensure this public 
                                                
25 The aim of reference offers is to establish terms, conditions, technical specifications and quality 
standards for third party use of passive infrastructure surplus capacity and local loop access.  
IFT, El Pleno Del IFT Modifica y Autoriza las Ofertas de Referencia del AEP En Telecomunicaciones. 
(Comunicado 106/2015), November 2015. 
26 IFT, El IFT Modifica y Aprueba las Ofertas de Referencia de Desagregación Efectiva de la Red Local 
Del AEP En Telecomunicaciones (Comunicado 111/2015), December 2015.  
27 Diario Oficial de la Federación, Acuerdo Mediante el Cual el Pleno del Instituto Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones Aprueba y Emite los Lineamientos Generales Sobre la Autorización de Arrendamiento 
de Espectro Radioeléctrico, 30 March 2016. 
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good goes to the highest-valued use.28 The guidelines state that any lease is subject to IFT 
approval and contracting entities must submit detailed transaction information. Telefonica 
successfully ceded AT&T spectrum rights in the 1.7/2.1 MHz band and América Móvil 
has requested permission to buy 60 MHz within the 2.5 MHz band from MVS.29 The sale 
is contested as MVS concession title was set to expire in 2016 due to underutilization. This 
transaction would increase América Movil’s spectrum share for mobile services from 41 
to 51 percent, leaving AT&T with 32 percent and Movistar with 16 percent.30  
 
700MHZ WHOLESALE NETWORK - RED COMPARTIDA 
The shared network bid was published in January 2016 for a public-private 
partnership to design, build, operate and maintain 90 MHz within the 700 MHz band and 
provide wholesale services. The Department of Communications and Transportation (SCT) 
is responsible for the bidding process while IFT oversees the selection process. The RFP 
was designed as a competitive tender or ‘beauty contest’ where the winner is first selected 
based on the greatest coverage offer above 85 percent second to its technical and economic 
proposal. Although this criterion is not subjective, as tends to be the case of beauty contests, 
it creates incentives for corruption and increases supervision costs. The bid design is 
critical to the project’s overall outcome which can dissipate coverage benefits. 
A new organization, Órgano Promotor de Inversiones en Telecomunicaciones, was 
created in March 2016 to administer the 700 MHz band and the fiber optic backbone 
previously administered by the state-owned electricity commission. The creation of a new 
                                                
28 Gregory L. Rosston, “Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation,” Review of Industrial 
Organization (2014) 45: 221. 
29 “Acuerdo AMX-MVS, ¿Debe El IFT Limitar a Telcel En la Banda Del 2.5?,” El Economista, November 
30, 2016.  
30 The CIU, “Telecomunicaciones: Reforma y Contrarreformas,” January 19, 2017. 
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entity raises concerns regarding unnecessary bureaucracy, added to early criticisms about 
the State’s role as operator and its decision to concentrate valuable spectrum in a single 
player. Furthermore, public investment of USD 7 billion over ten years was reduced from 
USD 10 billion which may have diminished the incentives to invest and could be an early 
sign of inefficiencies associated with government owned infrastructure for wholesale 
services.31  
The law being too specific by stating that the 700 MHz must be used as a wholesale 
only network limits policy alternatives. IFT will track coverage objectives through a 
population density mapping tool with information provided by the winning contractor and 
test data transmission rates.32 As of now there are no explicit mechanisms to evaluate policy 
success. To monitor progress, IFT should track and provide detailed quarterly data that is 
not limited to aggregate coverage percentages, average speed rate and average cost per Mb, 
but is disaggregated by regions for fixed and mobile markets with before and after rollout 
comparisons.  
The project has already faced difficulties staying on schedule. Initially scheduled 
to launch in 2014, the proposal submission deadline was changed twice since the bid was 
published and results were also delayed from mid-August to November 17, 2016.33 Only 
two bids were submitted by consortia Altán and Rivada Networks. Rivada was disqualified 
for failing to pay the MXN 1,000 million guarantee on time and filed a legal injunction 
                                                
31 Although the ownership model differs, Australia experimented with a government owned wholesale only 
fixed broadband network that has had cost overruns and taken longer that estimated to deploy. See Lucia 
Gamboa and Andrew Medina, The End of Australia’s National Broadband Network?, (Washington DC: 
Technology Policy Institute, 2016). 
32 Minimum 1Mbps upload and 4Mbps download speeds as stated in the RFP. SCT, Red Compartida: 
Bases Del Concurso Internacional, (2016). 
33 "SCT Retrasa Fallo Sobre Red Compartida". El Economista, July 2016. 
 14 
contesting its disqualification.34 Mexican-US consortium Altán was awarded the 20 year 
PPP contract with a 92.2 percent coverage offer.35  
The decision was not void of corruption scandals claiming that Altán had access to 
the Mexican government internal business model.36 US-based, Irish-owned Rivada 
Networks later claimed the process was rigged. In response, SCT sued Rivada for 
defamation, the first suit of this kind by a federal agency.37 
The previous normative and regulatory review suggests IFT secured its authority 
with overall initial success, implementing new regulations and imposing sanctions for 
anticompetitive behavior. These outcomes, however, do not directly translate to reform 
success. Important setbacks include IFT taking longer than estimated to implement 
infrastructure sharing and network unbundling asymmetric regulations, and – together with 
SCT– delaying the wholesale wireless network bidding process. Down the road, it will be 
important to evaluate the Red Compartida’s cost-effectiveness and whether the initiative 
crowded out private sector investment that would have occurred subsequently. The 
following section looks at quantitative indicators to evaluate changes in market share, 
coverage, prices and investment in the fixed and mobile markets, yielding mixed results.  
                                                
34 “SCT Emitirá este Jueves Fallo de Red Compartida,” November 16, 2016. 
35 SCT, La Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes da a Conocer el Fallo del Concurso de la Red 
Compartida, (November 2016). 
36 “Mexican Officials ’Sought to Rig’ Mobile Bid Against Ganley’s Rivada,” The Irish Times, December 
20, 2016. “Rivada Claims Altan Won Mexico’s Red Compartida Award ‘through improper and perhaps 
criminal means,’” December 15, 2016.  
37 “SCT Demanda a Rivada,” El Economista, February 5, 2017. 
 15 
Fixed Market  
MARKET SHARE  
Telmex –América Movil fixed market subsidiary– retail market share by number 
of lines decreased 5.3 percentage points since the Reform and 3.4 since it was declared 
dominant (see figure 2).38 Since the Reform, Telmex has experienced a decline of 2.9 
percent in fixed services subscriptions from 22.4 million to 21.7 by the end of Q2 2016. 
The decrease is mainly associated with the decline of fixed telephony subscriptions 
attenuated by the growth of broadband subscriptions, which by the end of Q2 2016 
accounted for 41 percent of Telmex fixed market. It is hard to pinpoint if the decrease in 
fixed telephony resulted from consumers switching service providers; however, Telmex 
fixed market share drop can be associated with the growth of Total Play and Grupo 
Televisa39 subscriptions by 51.9 and 32.4 percent respectively from Q1 2014 to Q1 2015 
(captured as ‘other’ if figure 2). 
                                                
38 Derived from The CIU (March 2016), op. cit. 
39 Grupo Televisa includes Bestphone, Izzi, TVI and Cablemas. Cablecom was aquired in Q3 2014 and 
Cablevisión Red in Q1 2015. 
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Figure 2: Fixed Market Share 
 
 
*Includes fixed telephony, broadband and TV. 
Source: Derived from The CIU (2016) and América Móvil Quarterly Financial Reports. 
Figure 2 above shows a downward market share for Telmex prior to Q2 2013 
suggesting that the Reform or its preponderance declaration have not influenced this trend. 
The decrease in market share between Q3 2014 and Q1 2015 can be associated with a loss 
of 757 thousand fixed subscriptions mainly from broadband which América Móvil 
attributes to a policy change in how it measures its active clients.40   
 
COVERAGE 
From 2013 to 2015, fixed telephone subscriptions decreased by 2.2 percent while 
fixed broadband increased by 15.9 percent. Figure 3 illustrates an already steady decreasing 
                                                









































trend in telephone subscriptions consistent with other countries with a slight increase in 
2015. Fixed broadband had been at comparable levels to upper middle countries but 
experienced a drop after 2012. It is not clear if the Reform or asymmetric regulation have 
contributed to the positive growth rate that followed which remains below upper middle 
income countries at 11.6 subscriptions per 100 people (see figure 4).  
Figure 3: Fixed Telephone Subscriptions 
 























Figure 4: Fixed Broadband Subscriptions 
 
Source: Derived from ITU and World Bank DataBank.  
The percent of households with internet access at home in 2015 was 39.2 percent, 
rising from 30.7 percent in 2013.41 As figure 5 shows, this trend is consistent with the 
growth rate in developing countries but substantially below developed countries household 
penetration at 81 percent in 2015.  
                                                
41 In 2014 average household size in Mexico was 3.8. INEGI, National Survey of Household Income and 

























Figure 5: Internet Access at Home 
 
Note: Percentages include access through a mobile device and may include micro-businesses with 
household contracts. 
Source: Derived from INEGI-ENDUTIH, IFT and ITU ICT Key indicators. 
 
These figures indicate that Mexico still has poor coverage and its growth trend is 
similar to comparable income level countries. By mid-2016, fixed concentration and 
coverage evidence shows no signs of growth that could stem from the telecommunications 
reform.  
 
PRICES AND SPEED 
Figure 6 shows that prices have been dropping for both fixed telephony and internet 
services since 2002 and the trend has been slightly altered by regulation. Fixed telephony 
prices dropped by 4.4 percent in Q1 2015 due to the national roaming removal measure 
which explains the slight increase in share of fixed telephones from 2014 to 2015 shown 

























the National Consumer Price Index, meaning that the reduction by itself does not have 
a significant impact on the average Mexican consumer.42  
Figure 6: Fixed Telephone and Broadband Price Changes 
 
Note: Price index based on INEGI National Consumer Price Index, December 2010=100. Internet 
services includes both fixed and mobile connections.  
Source: INEGI.  
Fixed broadband prices increased by 1.6 percent from Q1 2014 to Q4 2015. In its 
2015 last quarterly report, IFT explains the increase could be related to greater speed 
offerings previously unavailable to households, confirmed by the increase in the percentage 
of fixed broadband connections between 10Mbps and 99.9Mbps from 11 to 76 percent for 
the same time period.43 While offerings are improving, Telmex who controls 67 percent of 
                                                
42 Telecommunication services contribute 4.81 percent in total including mobile telephone (2.11), fixed 
telephone (1.29), Pay TV (0.82), Internet service (0.42), national long distance (0.10) and international long 
distance (0.05) services. INEGI, as cited on IFT 4Q 2014 Report.  
43  IFT, “Cuarto Informe Trimestral Estadístico 2015,” December 2015. Akamai’s State of the Internet 
Report (Q1 2016) shows that for all internet connections only 4 percent are above 15Mbps. This measure 






































































































































the market had one of the slowest speeds among competitors in 2015 at 5.2 Mbps44 and 
one of the worst performance in Netflix ISP Speed Index in Q4 2016 with 2.86 Mbps and 
2.95 Mbps average prime time bitrate for Telmex and Telnor respectively.45 Both ISPs 
experienced small improvements from 2.13 Mbps and 1.77 Mbps Q1 2015 levels. 
 
INVESTMENT 
The IFT highlights the growth of the telecommunications sector’s GDP vis a vis 
the national GDP with an average annual growth rate of 11 percent compared to 4 percent 
respectively from 2011 to 2015.46 This growth, driven by the increase in average revenue 
after the Reform from MXN 366 billion to MXN 427, is a positive indicator of regulation 
not suppressing the market. It suggests that service providers, particularly those subject to 
asymmetric regulation have been able to overcome its potential negative impacts.  
Fixed market total investment grew from MXN 27.3 billion in 2013 to MXN 47.6 
billion in 2015 (see figure 7). The three largest operators, Telmex-Telnor, Grupo Televisa 
and Megacable increased their investment as a share of revenue as figure 9 shows. Telmex-
Telnor doubled its investment as a share of revenue to 25 percent driven by an increase in 
total investment of MXN 12.3 billion from 2013 to 2015.47 This indicates Telmex-Telnor 
overcame its revenue decrease associated with the removal of roaming charges on 
international long distance calls on January 2015 and the release of unlimited international 
talk time packages. The investment increase could stem from América Móvil expanding 
coverage in the fixed sector where it faces less competitive pressure. This move could 
                                                
44 According to PCMag Index that combines 80% download speed and 20% upload speed by ISPs based on 
Ookla’s Speedtest.net.  
45 “Mexico ISP Leaderboard,” Netflix ISP Speed Index, December 2016. 
46 IFT, Telecommunications in Mexico: Three Years After the Constitutional Reform, (2016), 12. 
47 IFT 4Q 2015 Statistics Report with data provided by operators last updated on December 2015. 
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benefit the 61 percent of homes who still do not have access to internet but can also be a 
source of concern if it further increases América Móvil’s market power.   
Figure 7: Fixed Market Total Investment by Operator 
 
Note: IFT 2015 figures are not always consistent with operators’ financial statements, if different 
the number reported by operator is used. 
Source: IFT 4Q2015 and 4Q2014 Statistics Reports, América Móvil 4Q2014 and 4Q2015 Financial 

































Figure 8: Fixed Market Investment as a Share of Revenue 
 
Note: IFT 2015 figures are not always consistent with operators’ financial statements, if different 
the number reported by operator is used. 
Source: IFT 4Q2015 and 4Q2014 Statistics Reports, América Móvil 4Q2014 and 4Q2015 Financial 
Reports, Megacable 4Q2015 Financial Report, Axtel 4Q 2015 Financial Results Press Release.  
Megacable had the biggest increase in investment by 31 percent as a share of 
revenue from 2013 to 2015 (see figure 8), a positive signal stemming from a smaller 
independent cable provider. While its MXN 3.6 billion investment represents only 7.6 
percent of total investment for 2015 as figure 7 above indicates, Megacable benefited from 
the removal of national roaming charges and on-net/off-net tariffs as part of asymmetric 
regulations imposed on América Móvil (see table 1 for reference). Megacable has 
experienced significant growth in unique subscribers (28 percent growth from 1Q14 to 
3Q16) and triple play services,48 a positive indicator for the fixed telephony competitive 
landscape. 
                                                




































MARKET SHARE  
Telcel’s –América Movil’s mobile market subsidiary– market share by number of 
connections had been slowly decreasing since 2006 but experienced its largest drop since 
declared dominant to reach 66.5 percent by Q2 2016 (figure 9). Movistar gained most 
connections from this reduction with an increase of 5.8 percent of its market share.  
While it is difficult to separate the effects of new foreign competition and declaring 
America Móvil dominant, the elimination of foreign investment restrictions and the 
entrance of AT&T (through the purchase of Iusacell and Nextel) represent a regulatory 
success. As figure 10 shows, the data does not reflect changes in market share trends since 
2006. By Q2 2016, AT&T controlled 9.2 percent of the market, less than the combined 
market share of Iusacell and Nextel at the time of the Reform. However, we could expect 
an increase of AT&T’s share in the coming years due to its competitive advantage as the 











Figure 9: Mobile Market Share 
 
Note: Percentages do not include MVNO’s. 
Source: Derived from GSMA Intelligence. 
The entrance of Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) into the market in 
Q2 2014 led by Virgin Mobile also generated expectations for increased competition in the 




Mobile broadband has impressively doubled from 24.4 to 50.1 connections per 100 
people since the Reform.50 However, one must be careful to interpret this as half of the 
population having mobile internet services as many individuals have more than one 
                                                
49 Market share reported by IFT for Virgin Mobile, Qbo Cel, Maz Tiempo, Cierto, Weex.  
50 This number is lower than IFT’s reported 54 per 100 people mobile broadband connections by Q2 2016 



















































































































subscription –shown by the smaller 44.7 percent of mobile internet unique subscribers (see 
figure 10). 
Figure 10: Mobile Telephone and Broadband Unique Subscribers 
 
*mobile broadband capable connections excluding M2M. 
Source: ITU, GSMA Intelligence. 
By Q2 2016, Mexico had 70.1 mobile unique subscribers per 100 people.51 Even 
though there is a natural tendency for slower subscriber growth as it approximates market 
saturation, there was a slowdown in mobile unique subscriber growth since 2010 that may 
be reverting as of Q3 2015 due to the Reform. Furthermore, as figure 11 shows, in 
comparison to Latin America & Caribbean and upper middle income countries, Mexico’s 
mobile penetration remains substantially below.  
  
                                                
51 This number from GSMA Intelligence data is significantly lower than the one commonly cited and 































Figure 11: Mobile Subscriber Comparison 
 
Source: World Bank DataBank. 
In terms of mobile internet penetration, Mexico’s 58 percent penetration is also 
below developed countries 66 percent penetration, although above developing countries at 
40 percent.52   
 
PRICES AND SPEED 
Between 2013 - 2015, mobile telephony prices dropped 28.9 percent despite a 9.1 
percent inflation growth in the same period. This drop is a positive result as mobile services 
represent 2.11 percent of the national price index, the largest share out of 
telecommunications services and the eighth largest weight of the overall index.53 However, 
overall internet services do not fare equally well with virtually no change in prices since 
                                                
52 GSMA Intelligence, The Mobile Economy, (GSM Association, 2016), 
https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file=97928efe09cdba2864cdcf1ad1a2f58c&download. 
53 Telecommunication services contribute 4.81 percent total including mobile telephone (2.11), fixed 
telephone (1.29), Pay TV (0.82), Internet service (0.42), national long distance (0.10) and international long 
























2013 as shown in figure 12. None the less, inflation has experienced a consistent upward 
trend in Mexico, 13.8 percent since 2013, while the communications price index has been 
negative at -21.9 percent –a common trend in similar Latin American economies.54  
Figure 12: Mobile Telephone and Internet Price Changes 
 
Note: Price index based on INEGI National Consumer Price Index, December 2010=100. Prior to 
2011 mobile telephony was included in the fixed telephony index.   
Source: INEGI.  
An analysis of pre-reform behavior is key to determining the effects of the Reform. 
Figure 13 shows that Movistar had begun lowering prices prior to the Reform while Telcel 
had been testing the market while slowly lowering prices as well. Although price 
information for AT&T is limited, figure 13 also indicates that market consolidation of 
Iusacell and Nextel has allowed AT&T to price more competitively and exert pressure on 
América Móvil and Movistar.  
                                                
54 Base 2013=100, the communications component includes fixed and mobile telephony, national and 
international long distance, internet, communications hardware and pay TV. The CIU, “Comunicaciones: 








































































































































Figure 13: Mobile Prices per Minute by Service Provider 
 
*Effective price per minute: Blended average revenue per user (ARPU) divided by minutes of use 
per connection, expressed as a rolling average for the prior 12 months. 
Source: Derived from GSMA Intelligence.  
 
Key to AT&T entrance –and a direct consequence of the Reform by removing 
foreign investment caps– was the removal of international long distance and roaming fees, 
which pressured Telcel and Movistar to follow suit.55  
In terms of speed, according to Ookla’s Speedtest, Mexico’s mobile average 
connection speed has improved by 77 percent in the past year.56 Telcel is the leader in LTE 
capable devices and offers the fastest mobile download speeds of 16.6 Mbps, followed by 
AT&T at 14.2 Mbps and Movistar at 9.2 Mbps.57 Akamai, however, reports a lower 
average mobile connection speed of 6.7 Mbps by Q3 2016.58  
                                                
55 The CIU, “Baja de Precios en los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones de México,” September 20, 2015. 
56 Ookla, “Mexico Speedtest Market Report,” 2016. 
57 Ibid. 






























Figure 14: Broadband Adoption Rates by Speed 
 
Note: The graph shows the percentage of unique IP addresses making connections to Akamai from 
Mexico with an average connection speed threshold above 4 Mbps, 10 Mbps, 15 Mbps and 25 
Mbps. 
Source: Derived from data in Akamai’s Connectivity Visualizations (2016). 
Figure 14 shows that the percentage of connections at 4 Mbps has grown 
substantially from 33 percent since América Móvil was declared dominant to 78 percent 
by Q3 2016. This upward trend began prior to the Reform and it is hard to say if it has had 
a direct effect maintaining the trend. While speed is increasing in the mobile sector, 4 Mbps 
connection is still low and there is very slow adoption at higher speed tiers of 15 Mbps and 












































































































Mobile market total investment decreased from MXN 21.9 billion in 2013 to MXN 
18.2 in 2015. In contrast to the fixed market, investment as a share of revenue in the mobile 
sector is substantially lower at 7.3 percent compared to 25 percent and as figure 15 shows, 
total investment decreased by approximately MXN 3.7 billion since 2013.  
Figure 15: Mobile Market Total Investment by Operator 
 
Note: Telcel's 2015 total does not include Opsimex investment. AT&T includes Iusacell, Unefón 
and Nextel for the three years. 
Source: IFT 4Q2015 and 4Q2014 Statistics Reports, América Móvil 4Q2014 and 4Q2015 Financial 
Reports. 
A positive sign is Telcel’s slight (1.4 percent) but increased investment as a share 
of revenue due to a larger than proportional increase in total investment. Movistar’s two 
percent decrease shown in figure 16 is associated with increased revenue, while AT&T’s 
1.8 percentage point decline is associated with a drop of investment from MXN 8.4 billion 



















Figure 16: Mobile Market Investment as a Share of Revenue 
 
 
Note: Telcel's 2015 total does not include Opsimex investment. AT&T includes Iusacell, Unefón 
and Nextel for the three years. 
Source: IFT 4Q2015 and 4Q2014 Statistics Reports, América Móvil 4Q2014 and 4Q2015 Financial 
Reports. 
Telcel’s market share had diminished prior to the Reform and continues this pattern 
while its revenue has been stable in the last three years. Telcel states it has been able to 
overcome the impact of asymmetric regulation through increased sales of fixed and mobile 
data and the reduction of hardware subsidies.59 The previous data indicates that, while hard 
to separate its effects, the 2013 Telecommunications Reform and asymmetric regulation 
has not altered the mobile market.   
  
                                                
































Mexico can celebrate two important achievements from its second attempt to rectify 
competition issues through legal reform: IFT has defended its mandate and new regulation 
has not crowded out investment. However, competition issues remain. Market 
concentration had a slowly declining trend since 2012 and this paper finds that the 2013 
Telecommunications Reform and subsequent actions have maintained this trend without 
substantial changes yet. Market concentration remains high as incumbent America Móvil 
retains above 60 percent market share for both fixed and mobile markets. Furthermore, 
broadband coverage and internet access remain at lower income country levels and while 
mobile telephony prices have decreased, broadband prices have not. America Móvil 
provides the poorest broadband quality service in the fixed market with some improvement 
in the mobile market offering the fastest connection among providers but with 78 percent 
of internet users still connecting at 4 Mbps.  
While not all deadlines have been met, the IFT has effectively implemented most 
asymmetric regulations, the courts have upheld its decisions, and –amid some controversy– 
leased and selected a winner for the 700MHz band PPP contract. Since 2013, total 
investment and investment per revenue increased in the fixed market, although not in the 
mobile market. Eliminating foreign investment caps has already benefited consumers with 






While it is hard to isolate the effect of individual policies, this case highlights the 
complex relationship between regulation and competition. Reducing institutional and 
structural barriers is important for sector growth but regulatory reforms can have limited 
impact or prove too restrictive in the long term. The 2013 Constitutional Reform and 
Telecommunication Law have been crucial actions to ensure institutional stability and 
sector growth. While this report looks at a limited time frame, there is a positive outlook 
for continued investment, increased broadband access and lower consumer prices.    
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Appendix 
Table 2: IFT Sanctions 




February 2014 Mega Cable - T 
Agreement to divide pay TV, 
telephone and internet market with 
Cablevisión 
33.5 
February 2014 Grupo Televisa – B  (Cablevisión) 
Agreement to divide pay TV, 
telephone, and internet markets with 
Cablevisión 
8.7 
2014 Megacable - B Monopolistic practices 33.5 
September 
2014* 
América Móvil - T 
(Telmex) 
Monopolistic practices against Axtel 
on interconnection services  49.3 
January 2015 America Móvil - T  (Telmex)  
Failed to inform on concentration 
intent 14.4 
January 2015 Dish - B Failed to inform on concentration intent 43 
March 2015 Maxcom - T Service failures 31.6  
March 2015 
Grupo Televisa - B  
(Cablevisión and 
Televisión Internacional) 
Failed to provide information for 
investigation 5.7  
November 
2015 
Telefónica - T  
(Pegaso PCS)  Service failures 410.9  
March 2016 Maxcom - T Did not meet service quality standards  31.6  
March 2016 TV Azteca - B Did not to comply with temporary channel use obligations  4.7  
July 2016 Megacable - B Did not comply with rebroadcasting obligation 24.2  
September 
2016 Megacable - B 
Did not comply with rebroadcasting 
obligation in two additional cities. 24.2 
September 
2016  
Grupo Televisa – B 
(Cablevisión and 
Televisión Internacional) 
Did not comply with rebroadcasting 
obligation 66 
April 2017 America Móvil - T  (Telmex) 
Use of TV concession without 
authorization  5.4 
*Investigation initiated by the Comisión Federal de Competencia (CFC), the antitrust 
agency replaced by the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica (COFECE). 
Note: The table includes sanctions to both Telecommunications (T) and Broadcasting (B) 
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